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Abstract
In response to the increased “cyber” threats to business, the UK and US Governments are taking steps to develop the training and professional identity of information security practitioners. The ambition of the UK Government is to drive the creation of a recognised profession, in order to attract technology graduates and others into the practice of cyber-security. Although much has been written by state bodies and industry commentators alike on this topic, we believe this qualitative study is the first empirical academic work investigating attitudes to that professionalisation amongst information security workers. The results are contextualised using concepts from the literatures of professionalisation and social topics in information security. 

Despite the movement to establish professional status for their industry, these practitioners showed mixed levels of support for further professionalisation, with a distinctly wary attitude towards full regulation and licensing and an explicit rejection of elitist and exclusive models of profession. Whereas the UK Government looks to establish “professional” status in order to attract entrants, such status in itself was seen to be of little import to those already working in the area. In addition there are significant tensions between managers embracing business- and human-centred security and those more interested in the technical practice of executing policy.

While these tensions continue, the results suggest that state attempts artificially to catalyse the professionalisation process for this group would be precipitate. Historically such projects have risen from the front line; ambitions to move the industry in that direction might see more success by identifying and delegating control to a single regulatory body, founded and respected by the people it aims eventually to regulate.

1) Introduction
The market for information security skills is the focus of much current attention. The number of entrants to the occupation is rising and its recruitment paths and qualification schemes are changing (Alderbridge Consulting, 2013). According to one report, demand for information security staff grew by 74% between 2007 and 2013, with over half of advertised positions requesting at least one certification (Burning Glass, 2014).

Having identified a significantly increased need for trained security staff, the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills [BIS] (2014) is engaging directly in the training and organisation of the occupation. It aims to create a cyber-security “profession”, with sufficient status to compete for talent with more established career options (Cabinet Office, 2011; BIS, 2014). In the US, the Department of Homeland Security [DoHS] (2012) is also active in developing “cyber skills” however the National Research Council [NRC] (2013) appears more cautious than the UK Government towards formal professionalisation. Alongside noting the effects of artificially manipulating labour markets, it cites the lack of a single body of knowledge to define such a profession (Burley et al., 2014). Yet references are already commonly made to information security “professionals” and a number of credentials exist to certify this professional status. To take one example, there are now over 100,000 holders of the Certified Information Systems Security Professional [CISSP] certification ((ISC)², 2014). So do these people already consider themselves qualified members of a recognised profession, and if not is achieving that status their ambition?

The contribution of this study is to present whether efforts to promote an information security profession resonate with the priorities of workers within the industry. Whilst professionalisation may increase its allure to potential entrants, it is this current generation of practitioners who must assent to its progress. The study examines their basic concept of “profession”, alongside their attitude to professional status as a motivator and the value of certification. In addition, it investigates practitioner perspectives towards the heterogeneity of professional identity noted by Burley et al. (2014) and others, examining whether those who implement technical controls and those who manage, educate, instil a security culture and issue policies represent a single occupation. 

2) Prior Work
To provide context to the analysis, several key concepts from two literatures are highly relevant. Firstly, the “social” strand of security research is briefly reviewed, which re-balances the emphasis between technical and non-technical aspects of practice. From this it is shown that there is a theoretical and substantive basis for differentiation between management and technical enforcement roles in security; it is upon this distinction that claims of a new and distinct profession (separate from the computing sciences) might be founded. Secondly, from the substantial sociology of professionalisation it is seen that the formation of professions is a dynamic and competitive process, where both new and existing areas of knowledge are the subject of rival claims for control. This provides a conceptual basis for framing the analysis.

2.1 Socially-Informed Security Practice
It is well-established in the literature that information security does not rely solely on the implementation of technical controls. Modern security is a human-centred process, fully informed by both technical and social aspects (Stanton et al., 2005; Von Solms, 2001; Brocaglia, 2005; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Bunker, 2012; Von Solms, 2006; Johnson and Goetz, 2007; Kayworth and Whitten, 2010). This shift is most strikingly seen in the recent conceptual challenges to the long-established confidentiality-integrity-availability (“CIA”) model. Once so fundamental to orthodox computer security texts, this triad is now seen as incomplete, since it emphasises technical continuity of individual systems over the human elements of managing security within an organisation (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000; Kolkowska et al., 2009, Ashenden, 2008). Many writers see this fuller consideration of the human user as vital for a comprehensive or “holistic” approach (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000; Bunker, 2012; Fink et al., 2008; Brocaglia, 2005; Dlamini et al., 2009). 

This socially-informed work does not seek to minimise the significance of technical policy enforcement, but rather to bring more equal consideration to the processes whereby policy is communicated and its acceptance negotiated. Although a consistent minor theme (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; Hitchings, 1995; McFadzean et al., 2006), such topics now appear under-represented in earlier work, relative to more even modern treatment (Furnell and Clarke, 2012). Such balance is essential; policy without the ability to enforce it technically is often toothless,. hHowever, conceptualising security in purely technical terms leads to its reification. Whilst one can source firewalls and software, one cannot purchase security as an alternative to making necessary behavioural and cultural adjustments in an organisation (Stahl et al., 2008; Ashenden and Sasse, 2013). Instilling a proper security culture is a particularly rich area of research, emphasising the centrality of human issues in information security.

2.2 Translating Security Policy into Culture
All well-accepted models for security management stress the fundamental importance of an effective policy (Blakeley et al., 2001; Von Solms, 2001; Doherty and Fulford, 2006; Stanton et al., 2005), however the mere existence of a policy does not inherently create security (Doherty and Fulford, 2005). Several studies have concluded that where readers regard security requirements as impossible or unnecessary they will either ignore or attempt to circumvent them (Wood, 1997; Post and Kagan, 2007; Adams and Sasse, 1999; Renaud, 2012; Renaud and Goucher, 2014; Barlow et al., 2013; Siponen and Vance, 2010). 

Education programmes must therefore move beyond simple awareness. An aware user who does not also understand and accept the security message may wilfully ignore anything inconvenient to their own tasks, particularly where is little compulsion to comply (Furnell and Clarke, 2012; Furnell and Thomson, 2009; Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004). They must be persuaded of a threat to their interests and that their action might be effective against it (Herath and Rao, 2009; Besnard and Arief, 2004; Siponen, 2000; Al-Awadi, 2009; Fulford and Doherty, 2003). To enable this, policies must be the product of dialogue rather than artefacts of diktat (Albrechtson, 2007; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010; Gagné et al., 2008). 

Without suitable social awareness and empathy, these cultural efforts will not be effective. Staff with a purely technical outlook may assume that resource priorities for staff throughout the enterprise mirror those of the information security function. Such staff when attempting to impart the security message will thus assume that deviation from policy is due to a simple lack of facts, which when transmitted will generate compliance (Stewart and Lacey, 2012). 

From this we can see that a role within the security function exists constructed around these social-based skills, which is functionally distinct from the techno-centric policy enforcement specialist.

2.3 Security Management as a Discrete Occupation
References are made to civilian computer security managers in the 1970s and 1980s (Van Biene-Hershey, 2007), although they did not initially command universal professional respect (Wooldridge et al., 1973; Watt, 1989). During the 1990s, factors such as the mass inter-networking of systems and the proliferation of malware resulted in an expansion of corporate security structures (DeNardis, 2007). Late decade governance models such as that of Von Solms (1999) proposed that organisations should employ a corporate information security manager, to work with a security forum within the overall governance structure. 

As the role became more distinct and security functions more mature, the emerging Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) role moved away from the IT function, often directly reporting to senior operational management (Neal, 2008). In part this reflects goal conflicts: IT management is driven by factors such as application performance, user satisfaction and cost, whereas security is concerned with the protection of assets from attack (Whitman and Mattord, 2009), if necessary to the detriment of performance or flexibility. 

More fundamentally however, security officers must understand all functions of a business in order to contextualise their professional judgements, then apply this understanding to all information management processes within it (Mahdavi and Elliot, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2007; Bunker, 2012; Johnson and Goetz, 2007; Rainer et al., 2007). A move to locate the function away from the CIO can thus be laid upon concrete distinctions of role and scope rather than purely to address conflicting priorities within IT (Krull, 1996). This migration has however led to the illusion of accessibility; choices not shrouded in jargon are made in public. Within the organisational bureaucracy, those choices are apparently comprehensible by non-experts and hence subject to the realities of business politics (Ezingeard et al., 2004). 

This is in essence proper; the business owns its data and has the right to take its own risk decisions (Kovacich, 1997; Humphreys, 2008). The CISO must therefore be able to understand and operate in the business environment to lobby management successfully. Indeed, the security function depends heavily on senior management support to translate its policy aims into business priorities (Knapp et al., 2006; Ashenden, 2008) and the genuine threat of sanction for those unwilling to follow. Security managers must however ensure that their clients understand accurately the risk they accept (Rhee et al., 2012) otherwise executives will take decisions simply in reaction to adverse events (Ezingeard and Bowen-Schrire, 2007). Those with a technical background who refuse to acquire these additional non-technical skills create their own de facto glass ceiling (Brocaglia, 2005). 

In the following sections we will see how the emergence of a distinct and novel area of knowledge and skill can be used as the foundation to a new claim of professional identity. To consider this possibility in relation to the modern information security practitioner, it is necessary first to step back slightly, to consider what constitutes a profession and to examine the dynamic nature of their formation.

2.4 The Sociology of the Professions
Having established that there is a possible nascent profession to examine, it is useful to review some concepts from what is a substantial area of 20th and 21st century sociology. Professions play a highly significant role in the lives of both the citizen and of corporate bodies, representing some of society's most powerful and influential individuals (Abbot 1988, p.1). Yet it is not clear precisely how – or even if – a profession differs from any other occupation. 

2.4.1 Definition
Cogan (1955) observed that “to define profession is to invite controversy”. Many of the early attempts to establish an analytical literature were centred around the identification of the traits associated with professional status (Abbott 1988, p.4; Freidson 1986, p.27; Crook, 2008). The principal sine qua non distinction of “the professions” was held to be an advanced level of knowledge or education, but this was almost always coupled with a commitment to ethical practice, some form of altruistic conduct and regulation by a body with a special relationship with the state (Saks, 2012). The distinctions thus identified were rarely theoretically-based, often being a simple retrospective deconstruction of the claims of existing dominant professions (Mangan, 2014). 

Implicit in most analyses is that some subset of workers stands apart from the others. A more fundamental challenge was made by Ritzer (1973), who suggested that alongside this traditional concept the term “professional” had become associated with any person discharging their duties in a competent and diligent manner. Public acceptance of this alternative model undermines the claims of a professional to be by virtue of their career alone the possessor of any particular distinction. Professionalism can for example be considered a question of moral and ethical choices in a particular organisational context rather than a binary state for which an occupation might qualify (Delattre and Ocler, 2013). Eventually for many the search for a precise definition was abandoned as an unhelpful distraction (e.g. Evetts, 2003; 2006), as focus switched to the motivations of the agitators rather than the strict enumeration of qualifying criteria.

2.4.2 Self Interest and Motivation
For those who recognise a distinction, the granting of special or exclusive status to a group of workers has always been controversial. Even the rather deferential early accounts (Macdonald 1995, p.2) recognised the perils of granting monopoly (Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933, p.1). During the 1960s and 1970s this concern increased, with particular criticism of the perceived “special privilege” given to the powerful professions (Macdonald 1995, p.6; Freidson 1986, p.29; Saks, 1983). This work comprises two phases, both highly critical of the opportunity for the wealthy to protect and increase their wealth. The first followed the work of Weber, which saw professionalism as “social closure” by the manipulation of supply and demand in the labour market (Macdonald 1995, pp.27-29; Saks, 1983). The second, Marxist, phase, was a critique of the relations between classes, where professions represented a separate social stratum possessing knowledge in lieu of capital (Macdonald 1995, p.30) which conspired with the bourgeoisie (Saks, 1983). 

Following this particularly active period of professionalism research (Gorman and Sandefur, 2011) attitudes have become more measured, with this earlier work now appearing somewhat overly cynical with respect to motive. Rather than pure criticism of self interest, attention has moved to whether professional associations, reinforcing shared values across its membership independent of the concerns of a specific workplace, are a useful way for the state to ensure proper behaviour of a vital occupation (Evetts, 2003). In any event, the potential for self interest does not fatally weaken the case for regulation provided the impact of incompetence is sufficient (Stahl, 2006). As the professions move to provide services in specialist areas (such as information security), such a case may become harder to establish; the public at large may not appreciate the impact of poor practice where they do not directly engage with the occupation (Stahl, 2008).

More recently, the study of the professions has since diverged into a number of interesting themes. Social and power concerns are still active topics, however this stream now generally discusses inclusiveness within professions across possible lines of (illegitimate) discrimination, alongside the declining power and increasing external regulation of modern professions (Adams, 2014). Case studies remain an active area of research (Adams, 2014); despite the decreasing prominence of the “self-serving monopoly” concept, interest remains high in the formation of new professions and the process by which this occurs.

2.4.3 Professional Formation
With some caveats (see Evetts, 2013), there is consensus that broad regional variations exist in cultural concepts of “profession” and in the modes of their formation, thus in professionalisation studies it is generally necessary either to contrast multiple regions or work within a single cultural and historical model. Observing the movement by the UK and US Governments identified above, we have opted to look towards the Anglo-American concept for this study.

According to this model, once specialists emerge and desire certification of their specialist skills, influence is obtained first by the establishment of an association, then ultimately by this body establishing a monopoly over an area of knowledge, ideally granted by the state (Wilensky, 1964;  Macdonald 1995, p.66; Freidson 1994, p.173). Unlike mainland European models (Neal and Morgan, 2000) which prefer top-down regulatory action by the authorities, usually Anglo-American governments have been wary of granting this delegation of power; candidates must first show that there is some greater public need which is thus answered (Macdonald 1995, p.199), and then that a profession has “the especially reliable knowledge by which to make decisions in the lay interest” (Friedson 1988, p.338). It is thus no surprise to see concerns about handing power to a professional body in the absence of this great need being raised in the current American debate (see NRC, 2013).

Where the state has been persuaded that sufficient risk is associated with incompetent practice and that there exists a body which can regulate it, membership of this institution becomes mandatory. As a result of the training, knowledge and ethical standards achieved (and responsibility which flows from technical autonomy) the profession is usually granted high status by society, and through the action of monopoly frequently able to charge a high fee (Cogan, 1955; Gorman and Sandefur, 2011; Freidson 1994, p.200; Sciulli, 2007; Macdonald 1995, pp.157-171). This “professionalisation” process – during which practitioners associate, organise themselves, then lobby for the state to grant control over their areas of expertise – has historically been seen as a continuum, upon which all professions could be placed and the current extent of their professionalisation assessed by case study (Wilensky, 1964; Abbott, 1988; Gorman and Sandefur, 2011).

This status is however transitory. Professions present exclusive claims of competence over areas of knowledge and practice, areas which are highly dynamic (Abbott 1988, pp.93-97) . The growth of science and technology has led to an increase in technical specialisations amongst the ranks of professions (Larson 1977, p.179); where these advances open new areas of knowledge, existing professions must capture it whilst defending their existing “territory”. Where the breadth of knowledge becomes unmanageable, they must either suffer fracture, or delegate to a subordinate semi-profession, as medicine has done with examples such as pharmacy, nursing and physiotherapy (Freidson 1988, p.47).

Far from being a settled set of entities with well-defined static boundaries then, these professions compete vigorously and continually to gain control over contested areas of knowledge. An expression of this competition is sometimes seen in a direct challenge between one profession and another for control, although this is usually impractical where is a degree of legal regulation or monopoly (Abbott 1988, p.95). Knowledge is far from static however, thus a second and key factor is technological evolution, where expanding domains cause a new area of practice to appear, leaving the existing professions to compete to fill the void of occupational control (fig. 1).


Fig. 1: A simple example of competition between existing professions relating to this study (examples given are purely for argument), based on the Abbot (1988) model.

As new areas of practice emerge and start to crystallise, specialist groups begin to form within the related established professions. Whilst the professions themselves jockey for control of the new areas, if this is unsuccessful (for example if their resources are taken up defending other claims) those specialists may consider that they are more aligned with peers in other professions than with their own group. Should they no longer feel well-represented by the existing bodies, their internal networks can splinter to create a new professional group (fig. 2).

Fig. 2: A hypothetical example of Abbott splinter-based formation of a new group from amongst existing professions.

Whilst Abbott's approach is not universally accepted in all respects (see Macdonald 1995, pp.14-17), it acts as a highly useful theoretical lens, informing and underpinning both the identification of data for capture and the analysis. Furthermore, it sensitises the researcher to concepts of fracture, competition, distancing from perceived subordinate groups, dissatisfaction with the existing order and the identification of new territory in the form of knowledge to be mastered.

An open mind must be maintained for the circumstances of these movements however. In the above example, several professions could compete for the new areas of practice, either as splinter groups or via their professional bodies; the researcher must not assume they have identified all the candidates and the mode of formation. As information security becomes less exclusively technical for example, the domain of physical and facility security (itself multi-disciplinary) could mount a challenge to add some part of this knowledge to its existing area of control (Griffiths et al., 2010). Similarly, much of the recent development in information security comes from legal and regulatory frameworks (Sundt, 2008), which might bring the practice closer to the knowledge domains of law and audit.

Within each of these various territories there exists a spectrum of credentials for attesting to professional competence. These are highly instructive, since they present the outward evidence of the campaigns of several professional bodies to compete for control of information security. 

2.5 Certifying the Information Security Professional
The widening of security practice from a techno-centric aspect of computing to a broad socio-technical domain of information management has occurred so recently that policy makers have predominantly had to acquire the new “soft” skills mid-career (Siponen, 2000; Ashenden, 2008; NRC, 2013; Stewart and Lacey, 2012; Alderbridge Consulting, 2013; Lacey, 2006). Such practitioners are not always confident in the execution of these important aspects of their role (Ashenden and Sasse, 2013); how then to attain and establish competence? 

An entire industry exists to operate certification schemes for security professionals; to date, governments have not directly regulated this market thus no limit on number or quality has been introduced. Whilst we saw above that this reticence is common, it has arguably hindered professional recognition since there is no clear single certification to recognise as a standard (Furnell, 2004; Tate et al., 2008; Schultz, 2005). Without a common body of knowledge, there cannot be a unified professional identity (Everett, 2011; Burley et al., 2014). And yet professional identity is clearly the aim of many such schemes, which often require both an examination and a qualifying period of experience. Tests of pure knowledge should not require a mandatory preparatory period, therefore these credentials are clearly meant to be the foundation to a professional claim of experience, skill and judgement, not simply demonstrating the recall of learned facts.

It is not clear that a mid-career certificate alone can grant professional status in the fullest sense. Aside from the definitional polysemy, professionalism is often said to be the application of substantial and abstract learning to the specific concerns of a client (Sciulli, 2007), which usually implies vocational graduate education (Evetts, 2003; Larson 1977, p.242). Hentea et al. (2006) see a preparatory graduate education as an essential foundation to the more transitory technical knowledge learned later in the career, and indeed the DoHS (2012) and BIS (2014) see the expansion of tertiary education as key parts of their plan for their respective national workforces. As seen above, it is upon this foundation of deep, specialist knowledge that professional claims are made.

Development of a recognised curriculum for security professionals is still incomplete but the subject of concerted efforts to improve (Wright, 1998; Hoffman et al., 2011; Hentea et al., 2006; Furnell, 2004). Groups such as the National Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education in the US are already formalising the development of suitable programmes (see Frinke and Bishop, 2004; Sharma and Sefchek, 2007). It is instructive though that security curricula are not yet set by a regulatory body for the occupation, as the control of training implies control of knowledge and hence jurisdiction. CESG (2014) has chosen the IISP framework as a basis for the assessment of postgraduate academic study, but it has used its own branding to promote the result rather than empowering the IISP. The latter action, after a campaign for recognition, would have been predicted by orthodox theoretical models of British professionalisation (Neal and Morgan, 2000). We can further observe that the UK has a charter body for computing which has an active security chapter (the British Computer Society) but also that the Institute for Information Security Professionals has also formed in the spaces around computer security, audit and computer law. That the IISP and BCS both run security certification schemes (and that the IISP's framework has apparently found favour with Government with regards to assessing education) is arguably an example of (constructive) Abbot-type splinter competition for control of a body of knowledge, along with the partial intervention of the state. 

The public campaigns of major institutions however are the focus of current government research attention and relatively well covered by large-scale reports and inquiries. Abbot's model identifies a gap in this body of work, forcing us to look beyond the outward works of professional bodies to the experiences and ambitions of the workforce they make a claim to represent, since regardless of intent no professional body can remain stable and advance its cause unless it is aligned with its constituents' own concerns. The aim may be to attract new members to the profession, however the current members will surely need to consent thus their views are also highly relevant. This study addresses that gap. It presents the perspectives of the workers themselves towards their status, their concepts of profession, whether they represent a homogeneous group and how well represented they are by those looking to change the status of information security practice.

3) Analytical Theory and Methodology
3.1 Philosophical Basis
Information security research has historically embraced the functionalist paradigm (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; McFadzean et al., 2006; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007), which is associated with a realist ontology; adherents subscribe to the existence of a truth independent of perception. This is coupled with a positivist epistemology wherein hypotheses are created and experiments created to test this truth (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This predominantly reflects the earlier “technical check list” approach to computer security, but is also uncontroversial in contemporary technical work. 

Recent empirical research in the human aspects of security management however (for example Albrechtsen, 2007; Ashenden and Sasse, 2013) reflects the substantial criticism of positivism in social studies (Lee, 2002; Burrell and Morgan, 1979), preferring the interpretative paradigm as advocated by Dhillon and Backhouse (2001). The decision to conduct an interpretative study here was further suggested by the exploratory nature of research into a topic in its formative stages of development, where forming a deep understanding is favoured over prediction and measurement. Although not a factor in this decision, it is also noted that large-scale participant recruitment is an intrinsic practical issue in researching a potentially sensitive and confidential subject with relatively senior managers (Ashenden and Sasse, 2013; Kotulic and Clark, 2003; Ezingeard et al., 2004), thus obtaining a statistically valid sample for positivist and quantitative work is problematic. The intent is therefore not to produce a claim of generalisable facts but to present an interpretation of the experiences of the interviewees.

3.2 Data Capture
Data was captured was by using semi-structured interview. Eighteen interviews were conducted between October 2012 and December 2013, on average seventy minutes in length. In line with King and Horrocks (2010), questioning was open and designed not to suggest what was expected to be a normal response. The intention was to explore the constructed view of the topic for the interviewee, thus no position was taken on the interviewee's comments, which were held to be intrinsically valid. Where answers required elaboration, this was achieved by detailed non-judgemental question, open invitation to expand or by attempting to offer a paraphrased outline of what was heard for their confirmation or rejection.

A pilot study was conducted with three interviewees, two introduced through the kind offices of colleagues and the third through the intervention of a professional association local branch representative. Initial main phase interviewee recruitment was a mixture of direct application by job title to a list of organisations and through advertisement to conference participants. In the former case, direct approaches were made to one hundred companies selected from the FTSE250 to provide access to the large enterprise sector. Reflecting the identification of a distinct Anglo-American model of professionalisation in the literature (see Neal and Morgan 2000) as well as practical considerations, all approaches were to UK-based organisations. Expansion to compare the results with states with differing cultural concepts of “professional” is noted as a potentially highly fruitful area of further work.

It was made clear in the initial approach letter that the scope was limited to the personal history and attitudes of the interviewee, rather than formally representing the position of their employer. This was assumed to be a less threatening prospect in terms of revealing data and more appealing in terms of subject interest, as well as requiring only that individual's time without expecting them to expend their own energy to secure time or clearance from others. Even so, as recruitment relied heavily on altruism a degree of volunteer selection bias must be acknowledged. As altruism and alignment with the profession rather than the role are indicators for professionalisation, it is assumed that those willing to assist with an academic study are likely to be those most open to the prospect. It was not possible to exclude this bias from the study.

The final sample comprised security managers and deputies (11), analysts and technical staff (5) and IT staff with security responsibility (2). Fields were predominantly enterprise commercial (9, of which 4 were from finance), public sector, education and utility (4), not for profit (2), independent contractors (2) and one general IT manager with security responsibilities in a small computer-based technical firm. All participants sought worked in the UK, although around one quarter were originally from outside the country. Four held degrees in a security field, eight held the CISSP or CISM qualifications and five also identified as a member of a professional body separately from holding a credential. This data was collected retrospectively to attempt not to lead the interviewee as to what was expected to be a marker of professionalism.

To ensure proper ethical practice and informed consent, prior disclosure was made of the research purpose and interview topic. This naturally limited the degree to which answers could be given completely without prior reflection (to gauge how important a topic this represented for the interviewee). The sensitivity of the topic and the confidential nature of examples and anecdotes which can be expected also created a particular ethical duty to remove identifying data, both in respect of the interviewee and any individual or organisation to which they might refer.

3.3 Analysis
Interviews were transcribed manually and verbatim, with initial analytic memos created during transcription. Transcripts were referred to interviewees for verification. NVivo was used to facilitate initial Structural Coding (Saldaña, 2009). Unitisation was thematic (Krippendorf, 2013) comprising those sections of text which are “related to each other through their content and context” (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). Whilst some methodology authors such as Schreier (2012) favour construction and revision of the coding frame from subsets of the data until complete prior to the main phase, in this instance a data-derived frame was built and developed throughout the coding process. Two reasons suggested this choice: firstly this allowed for the possibility of theoretical sampling and adaptation of the protocol following analysis of early interviews. Secondly it was felt that to do otherwise unjustifiably assumes a homogeneity of category coverage whereby the bulk of the data added no new codes or novel perspectives to the initial subset.

During initial coding, additional analytic memos were created which were used to support the arrangement of codes into categories, promote consistency of coding and note conflict or agreement between interviewees or with theory. Seven major categories were identified; the most significant data within each category was identified mainly by reference to coding frequency by participant (Saldaña, 2009), although in keeping with the interpretative approach interesting and unexpected minor themes are also noted in the analysis. An examination of the coded text for these principal codes was combined with the earlier memos to generate the principal findings within each category, which are presented briefly in the next section. A further cycle of analysis and memo creation was used to identify the two core themes presented in the discussion. In line with King and Horrocks (2010), positivist models of quality criteria were rejected in favour of validation between the authors of the credibility of the results from the data.

4) Results
This section presents the principal topics which emerged from the interview data. Results are arranged into seven major themes, which reflect predominantly the most significant categories in the developed coding frame. Firstly the career experiences of these experienced staff show how this leading generation had in many cases to create and form their own occupation and identity. This is followed by noting the striking emphasis on social aspects of security seen in the data, which highlights the question of unity of role and practice within the workforce, and which was also significant in the subsequent discussion of future recruitment patterns. The four following themes then address the question of professional status itself: what the term meant for the interviewee, what the role of certifications should be, how the profession should be regulated and an assessment of current and future status. The key points which emerge from these themes are then brought together in the discussion section below.

4.1 Career Origin and Occupational Orientation
Only three interviewees – all analysts – intentionally entered security at the first opportunity. The majority (13) had moved into security through an information-technology-related role, approximately in accord with the statistics collated by Alderbridge Consulting (2013). Of the two remaining, one was recruited internally from an administrative role and one from audit; both of these reported having been nominated by a security officer for their specific (non-technical) skill set. Of the previously technical recruits, the explanation given for the move was in some cases a positive choice; some references were made to interest after exposure to security operations whilst in a parallel technical role. 

“I saw an opportunity to move into the security department, I thought that would be a good move, a good career choice. It was something that interested me.” Finance 3

Similarly weighted however was that the move was more passive or an act of fortune.

“I suppose I fancied a change [...] I thought, do you know what, an opportunity came along and I took it. [… If that opportunity had not occurred] it wouldn't have been something I would have consciously done, I don't think.” Finance 2

A number had personally agitated for greater security presence and been “rewarded” with a mandate to become the primary expert and actor on the subject, creating a new function. 

4.2 Distinct Technical and Social Aspects to Practice
Despite their mostly technical origins this (mostly management) sample overwhelmingly stressed the importance of the social aspects of security. Empathy rather than criticism was displayed when recognising that clients were under pressure to execute their tasks in whichever way was the most expedient without reference to security policy. It was accepted that attempts unreasonably to constrain internal clients represent a failure to mitigate the risk in a suitable manner. 

“If somebody has caused a security incident by bypassing a security control that actually impacted their productivity so heavily that the only way to get their job done was to go around it, then that security control was poorly designed and poorly implemented.” Charity 1

Although seen as regrettable, it was generally recognised that the array of modern computing platforms is difficult to secure purely with technical controls, without affecting the functionality demanded (see Gagné et al., 2008). There was agreement that this forces the extension of trust and judgement to the user. The task was then seen as ensuring that users understand both that there are security aspects to their behaviour and the importance of their choices in a business survival context.

“That puts your information in the users' hands. If they aren't educated [...] then it just puts the whole thing at risk. It puts too much emphasis on the technical controls when actually they don't necessarily need to be there. Technical controls often cost money and it often throws the balance out. The users on the ground need to know.” Local Government 1

It was clearly accepted that “the data belongs to the business” as originators and owners. Data for this group was no longer an IT asset to be protected with IT rules, it was seen as a corporate asset whose security is a question of risk management. 

“The conversation has to be a dialogue, it has to be “OK, well if you don't do this then this might happen, are you prepared to accept that? If yes then fine, but you sign that risk off. If no, here's what I recommend you achieve in terms of outcomes by tweaking your business process. If I can help you achieve those outcomes then please engage me.” Charity 1

It was noted that as risk decisions are taken typically at a senior level, junior security staff now have relatively unprotected exposure to business executives, which impacts on recruitment. The social and political skills required to interact with demanding executives were seen as quite distinct from the technical process of risk mitigation. 

"How do you tell the chief exec he's got to spend a hundred grand putting a GSOC together? You can have a technical specialist, but […] you need the ability to think on your feet, to handle the questions, to convey technical ideas in business language. [...] Would I be comfortable putting [someone] in front of the chief exec [who would] ramble around and not really get to the point? The exec's a busy guy." Manufacturing 1

Distancing security from purely the management of technical computing controls was near-universal. This reflected a functional distinction, in that physical security, processes, hiring policies, legal aspects and so on are not directly linked to technology thus it was considered that IT security is a subset of information security. Effective security management was seen to require strong social skills to train, translate for and enrol non-technical users in their own terms, and an ability to draft and maintain policies and other documents. 

“...security needs to be so much more. It's much more about business, process and people. If the IT comes before the business and process and people then things go wrong.” Charity 1

4.3 Staff Recruitment 
When questioned, most participants refused to nominate a particular source department for information security practitioners from within the business. Whilst there was a recognised necessity to understand the base principles of the technology they supervise and control, it was felt that not all security staff need to be hands-on technical experts, nor to have that background. 

“I think it will become an occupation in its own right, but I think you'll find that a lot of people will be recruited into it from a more diverse population of people.” Finance 2

The field did not exclude the advancement of technical security staff into policy-forming roles, merely identifying that some very highly competent technical people would lack sufficient social skills to move away from the implementation of controls and technical strategies. Moreover, it was felt that such people would not automatically wish to make this change nor – critically – regard it as a progression. In this model, technical specialists would have to develop other skills mid-career to enter security management, well beyond merely acquiring the management requirements of supervising others, suggesting that this represents a change in professional career track.

“Some of them are quite happy just working with technology. [...] I haven't seen too many people in recent years with that kind of background getting into security management, that's the way it's gone.” Finance 1

4.4 Concepts of Professionalism
When asked what it means to be “a profession” the view elicited was complex, affected heavily by the mixed definition of best practice versus distinguished and elite knowledge-based occupation, rejection in some cases of the elitism of the professional concept, and reservations about comparing information security to the more established professions.

Answers summed to: those who exercise of a position of responsibility who have attained and maintain high levels of competence, selfless best practice, ethical behaviour and output with a value beyond mere profit. In other words, a subset of the traditional “traits” which have been listed since the early work in the area (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933) and those used by NRC (2013). 

Certain aspects of the more critical analyses of professions were notably absent. This sample did not seek to establish itself as representing a higher rank; for many indeed the distinction between the professions and other occupations was meaningless, with the quality of and attitude to work being the criteria for professionalism rather than the grandeur of the task, as described by Ritzer (1973). Whilst there would be a natural tendency for them to underplay the less laudable ambition of raising their own professional status, the assertion by BIS (2014) and others that high status is necessary to attract candidates to a profession is at odds with the stated views of this sample. 

Perhaps the most interesting aspect was that answers were frequently rather mixed and contradictory. Definitions varied so widely that it was impractical to code individual themes. The tone and content of the answers, in strong contrast to the other topics covered, was exploratory and hesitant. Several noted that serious thought on the topic was novel to them and had difficulty articulating their answer. Responses such as “The things I've come out with I haven't really thought about, to be honest” and “Gosh, I'd never even given a thought to that” were typical. Preoccupation with professional advancement, as might be expected in practitioners of an occupation vying for increased status and formalisation, was not seen.

4.5 Licensing and Certification
Sentiment towards industry certifications overall was positive; a majority of this sample had undertaken qualifications and actively encouraged others to do so. Motivations varied. In many cases they found the process an interesting learning experience, indeed some respondents reported undertaking a qualification for the intellectual development and training in its own right. The primary drivers however were to act as a benchmark of competence and commitment to employers and colleagues, particularly where the practitioner had no original qualification or education in the area.

“I think there was probably an element of I wanted to get a qualification to prove I knew what I was talking about, and that I was capable of passing that exam.” Manufacturing 1

Conversely, whilst respecting the intellectual effort and depth of knowledge required for academic qualifications, this sample did not see security as being essentially a graduate profession. One analyst, who was an exception having completed both academic and professional qualifications but who saw little respect for the former in the industry, noted:

"...if I would approach a recruitment agent and I would say 'I've got my master's degree from Royal Holloway', they would be less interested in me than if people would say, 'I've got my CISSP.'" Communications 1

It seems strange that one of the leading UK degrees is not considered at least an equal asset compared to a mid-career certification requiring considerably less direct study time. Perhaps then this prejudice reveals a generation which learned its skills outside the occupation and then cross-trained, and which is resistant to considering itself under-qualified but not threatened by markers of experience. Clearly, acceptance of graduate training will probably accelerate as those who identify with job-acquired skills are replaced by those who trained pre-career.

"I think it will change. I think a lot of people that are in my position have come in from other technology strands [...] but I'd like to think that someone out of school, GCSEs, or 'A' Levels or university education, can actually start at the bottom and work up to a reasonable career." Utility 1

Whilst positive towards credentials in general, tellingly the sample did not identify any particular certification as a qualification criterion, and rejected the concept of a certification being an absolute requirement they would require for employment. CISSP and CISA schemes were seen as particularly useful for career purposes, however this was qualified by some as being an artefact of the human resources sifting process rather than having been achieved purely on merit. Those credentials which claim to be an test of professional status are apparently not deemed sufficient for this purpose by those employing the next generation, who put far more store by outright career experience.

4.6 Identity and Regulation
The number of security-related qualifications and certification schemes was held to be a challenge to professional status, something which was reflected by business contributors to the BIS (2014) discussion, amongst others cited above. Aside from the cost of gaining and maintaining multiple credentials, the market was felt to contain too many certificates of varying quality and with an inconsistent body of knowledge. The low perceived value of some was felt to diminish all, since the more established professions were felt to have a far more recognisable and substantial test for entry set and issued by their single central body.

“For me, there should only be one professional body as well. We have schisms within information security. So we've got ISACA and we've got (ISC)², we've got IISP and then we've got – well there's loads, there's ISF, just as an example, then you have the other technical certifications as well. What we should do is move them to one body, one governing body to cover them all.” Finance 3

As an emerging and formerly technical discipline with relatively little contact with the general public, it is not surprising that the occupation is not as well-established as those with recognised names and historical identities. Even within business however it was felt that information security is not well-enough known as a discrete occupation to support its being regarded generally as a profession outside the industry.

“I think people have absolutely no idea what information security is and how it differs from data protection, IT security, information governance, any of that stuff. I think it would be impossible for people outside information security to see information security as a profession because they just don't even understand the basic concepts and differentiators.” Charity 1

4.7 Status and Power
A factor behind the reserve towards professionalisation was whether the gravity of the role currently bears comparison to that of the more established professions. The traditional cases were felt to be responsible for the vital interests of the person, without which responsibility it was felt difficult to justify a claim to similar status. This resonates with the attitude of the NRC (2013) in contesting whether regulation in the US was justified. This may change in the future should the nature of the threat be seen to change; one force for the expansion of information security concerns is the increasing “cyber” threat to safety-critical systems and the continuous function of the state (Von Solms and Van Niekerk, 2013).

Much of this sample did not see the impact of unregulated security practice as sufficient to warrant state intervention, something NRC suggest is a pre-requisite to supporting licensing. The comparison made by DoHS (2012) with airline pilot training and certification cycles is surprising, and suggests a far higher assessed impact of incompetent security practice than this sample would support.

“Obviously when it comes to lawyers [...] they're going to represent you in court. If it's a doctor, you've got to hope they know where your appendix is [...] But why information security, if you were going to say that, why doesn't everyone who works in [fast food outlets] have to have a qualification in cooking?” Technology 1

A difficulty then for this profession is a distinct lack of gravitas, and power outside times of crisis. It was strongly felt by the sample that the traditional professions owe much of their status to their long periods of establishment compared to the relative infancy of information security.

“Yes, I do, because if you think about medicine and engineering and law, those professional skills have been around for millennia and we as a profession are just like a blink of an eye. We've got a long way to go, we really do.” Finance 3

5) Discussion
Two themes emerge from the data. Firstly, the degree to which practitioners are aligned with moves to professionalise their industry. Secondly, that the process of competition for control of knowledge is not yet complete.

5.1 Qualification for Practice
It can be seen from this sample (and quantitatively from the survey by Alderbridge Consulting (2013)) that the current leaders of information security departments are atypical for an established profession. Most are pioneers, having entered mid-career from a computing background, learning on-the-job and in many cases forming the security team around them. Their training may have included formal taught elements through gaining a certification, however they have not had a pre- and early-career socialisation process such as medicine or law might provide, nor has most of their alignment with their occupation come from a set qualification and formation process. Given the changes proposed for an increase in graduate entry, we can expect this to change very significantly. 

"I think there's an important question, which you should probably just think through, which is: the evolution of time and knowledge has meant that the role of security officer in five years' time is going to be very different to the role that it is today." Finance 2

The occupation is in a state of transition. Professionalisation has doubtless begun, and begun from within as is normal. Although governments may be exerting external influence, the degree programmes which naturally occur during professionalisation processes had already begun in this field and government action in this regard is in some ways merely catalysis. The process of replacing those who established a bridgehead without such luxuries as vocational degrees (and their accompanying prejudices) is under way.

Current practitioners, as might be expected, downplay the importance of vocational graduate entry (which would leave them under-qualified). Certification is seen as a useful albeit imperfect method for demonstrating basic competence, but again unsurprisingly is held to be no substitute for experience. It is strange however that there should be such a strong theme of certifications lending weight to one's voice during internal debate. It seems most unlikely that colleagues across a meeting table would have a mechanism to determine whether the practitioner was qualified. Rather, it seems more likely that the certification adds confidence to the practitioner to believe that their opinion is backed by an independent test of competence and subject knowledge. 

This lack of status confidence may wane as graduates in a high-status professionalised industry take their place. Alternatively, the professional qualification might be replaced by “chartered” status following sufficient in-role training. Either way, taken with the tendency to align with the profession born of the socialisation process noted above, it will be necessary to ensure that this does not result in inappropriate assertiveness and over-confidence skewing security's service-based relationship with its client.

Historians of the process would expect a sufficiently mature professionalisation movement to welcome a state offer of granting recognition and regulation. Attitudes towards licensing in this group however were split evenly. Around a quarter had a positive attitude to mandatory licensing, with the rest cautious, neutral or very negative. On balance opinion was against such a move. The predominant concern was that licensing would exclude the competent who qualified by experience. This is paradoxical, since competent people could by definition pass any genuine test of competence even if they had not previously chosen to, and in any case one prerequisite for most of the front-runner certifications is accruing several years' experience prior to application. Those would-be professional bodies currently issuing certifications have therefore not sufficiently lobbied these people to believe that they are true markers of competence and experience qualifying the holder for office.

In addition, although the respondents would have been unlikely to express a self-interested position in absolute terms, there is an interesting juxtaposition between the “protectionist racket” thesis of mid-20th century professionalism sociology and the cautious approach to association and misgivings about excluding anyone from practice shown by this group. Being seen to be professional in terms of ethics, competence, authority and so on were important for these practitioners but professional status per se was not an important driver for them. In contrast to the confident and enthusiastic answers to questions of security's place in the business, responses on the topic of professionalism and certification were much more laboured; discussing the concept in many cases fazed the interviewee.

It would seem that the project to professionalise the industry has yet to convince its rank and file that this is a real priority for them. A professionalisation campaign has arisen from within the occupation (see Lacey, 2006) however attempts externally to drive the process quickly may meet resistance if the practitioners do not embrace the pace of change. In turn, any professional programmes artificially imposed from outside risk not being supported, since it appears the current qualifications and competence schemes are not fully accepted at present. Some significant resistance to the idea of government regulation was noted; BIS and CESG may therefore achieve their objectives more effectively by more strongly sanctioning a well-respected member-based organisation (as they do incompletely with the Institute of Information Security Professionals) at arm's length, rather than being seen to be leading the process themselves.

5.2 Unity of Domain
These interviewees, predominantly managers themselves, did not on balance view security management as a specialisation subordinate to some overall wide domain of “security”. In particular they did not consider themselves peers of the technical experts who execute the policies they issue. Rather, some felt that technical matters are merely one domain observed from their higher place in the hierarchy, a hierarchy it is not at all clear that the technicians themselves would accept. For their part, although they had less of a voice in this study, it was felt that the technical colleagues of the sample do not universally see policy-writing and the office of CISO as their natural career target. This is not explained in pure management terms (where retaining trade knowledge is traded for general management skills in late career) since senior lawyers and doctors, for example, retain their qualified practitioner standing despite gaining pure person-management skills. In fact, the role of the security manager for these interviewees was a distinct operational role, one of policy, consultancy, education, culture and risk, not purely one of personnel, resource allocation and budgets. Currently therefore, there is no one unifying role with multiple specialities which can be labelled a profession nor develop directly into one. More commonality in pre-career education may act to unify this divide or, by forcing a choice of study tracks, codify and formalise it. 

If the latter, the two professions will need to agree a relationship. Professions will generally accept hierarchies within the profession itself, from those of greater experience or competence (Freidson 1986, p.162), but also a hierarchy of professions within a related area (Abbot, 1988), for example the “superiority” of the physician over the nurse, or the lawyer over the clerk. What emerges from this sample (with a strong bias towards management) is a sense that there is a valued place for the technical computer security professional but that this practice is functionally subordinate to the socially-informed practice of security management. When questioned whether one might move from a technical to a management role this was accepted as possible, but only for a socially-able subset who gained the relevant additional skills. The technical staff may accept hierarchical subordination to those reflecting business decisions, but perhaps only if seen to have a similar degree of expert status. Something closer to the technically specialist barrister instructed by the client-facing peer solicitor might be necessary.

Whichever arrangement is reached, the resolution of this tension is potentially a condition for further professionalisation. It seems highly likely that the NRC (2013) position is correct, viz. identifying a finite number of relatively distinct areas of knowledge must take place. This data strongly agrees with that view (as expressed by Burley et al. (2014)) and suggests the technical-policy continuum is a prime candidate for this resolution. The struggle to define an area of practice is bound up with the currently unsatisfactory nature of mid-career professional certification. The number of aggregation centres for knowledge will probably match the number of eventual professional identifies and specialisms to emerge and possibly their hierarchical relationship.

Similarly to above, it is seen that efforts artificially to hasten the process of professionalisation do not respect the dynamic nature of profession-formation which was illustrated and discussed in the literature review. The ambiguity of role discussed and the outstanding questions of hierarchy between different sections of practice suggest that further time is needed for discrete roles to crystallise out. If forced to occur artificially purely to hasten creating a pipeline for producing technical security graduates (overseen in the UK, it might be noted, the UK Government's technical computer security department CESG) there is a risk that any single professional body may have to resolve internal tensions along these fault lines.

6) Conclusions
The contribution of this study is to contrast attitudes towards professionalisation amongst UK-based information security workers with their government's stated aim to develop their professional status. It is shown that although there is cautious support in principle for limited further professionalisation, practitioner attitudes are less positive than those leading the process and they remain on balance wary of full regulation and licensing, particularly those led by government. Whilst efforts are under way to raise the field to “professional” status in order to attract entrants, this status was not found to be a major motivating factor in this sample.

Changes to the recruitment and training of security staff, including a different set of motivating factors for entry, will likely affect their motivation, demographics and socialisation process. The practitioners in this study were highly business-centred pioneers in mid-career, who have imported attitudes from other roles. This formation and recruitment profile leads them to stress the value of experience and social factors over learned technical skills and graduate entry. Ensuring that these skills and priorities are included in undergraduate socialisation and training is a key challenge for those looking to form a supply pipeline of graduates.

It is concluded that efforts to encourage professionalisation through state action before internal issues are resolved would be unwise and premature. Exerting external pressure artificially and prematurely to condense strands of practice into a single occupation does not respect the gradual and competitive nature of profession-forming and boundary settlement observed in professionalisation case histories. In particular, this study shows functional and cultural tensions between those engaged in policy forming and those in technical enforcement, which have been trailed extensively in the recent literature. These tracks must be either reunited or, in line with comparable established multi-disciplinary systems, resolved into identifiable roles in a settled hierarchical relationship before professionalisation can be effective. 

The results further suggest that the current wide array of standards and certification bodies must be rationalised into a single professional body for each discrete occupation, offering a formal career structure and credential respected and recognised by practitioners, employers and peers. Government policy leaders may therefore be best advised to sanction and support a practitioner-originated scheme rather than act in lieu of a strong professional body.
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